

Intersections of Pluralism and Social Cohesion

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I. INTRODUCTION

One “social fact” that has achieved consensus for well over a century is that social cohesion and well-being are connected. In recent years, social cohesion has been endowed with extraordinary capacities in relation to everything from the social determinants of health to reconstruction and peace-building in post-conflict situations, and to easing the “fault lines” of socio-economic and cultural diversity in both the Global North and South. Therefore, the absence of social cohesion or threats to it create anxiety in policy communities. Even in the late 19th century, Émile Durkheim’s thesis about the division of labour concluded that the cohesion that had created solidarity in “traditional society” was at risk from modernity.¹ In the closing decade of the last century, similar concerns came to the fore as governments, international organizations and ordinary citizens began to worry about the state of social cohesion.² This concern about factors undermining social

cohesion continues. Policy communities have also identified social cohesion as contributory to improving well-being of all sorts: peace after conflict, economic growth, social development, cultural harmony in diverse societies and population health. These communities seek the conditions fostering social cohesion or the contributions of social cohesion to societal well-being.

In this paper, we observe that social cohesion is sometimes a positive outcome to be generated and sometimes a factor contributing to the hoped for well-being. Given this difference in locating social cohesion on a pathway to well-being, it is hardly surprising that the concept has no single definition.³ In its 2013 project to develop a Social Cohesion Radar, the Bertelsmann Stiftung incorporated “a focus on the common good” as one dimension of social cohesion,⁴ and a literature overview similarly identifies “orientation to the common good” as one of three essential dimensions of the concept.⁵ But there are other meanings.⁶ In a World Bank policy

document, social cohesion is described as converging norms across groups that provide a framework within which diverse groups can coexist peacefully.⁷ Yet others define social cohesion in terms of social capital, itself defined as trust. Thus, “a socially cohesive society [is] one in which people trust each other.”⁸ For its part, and in preparation for its own programmatic attention to social cohesion, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) provided an all-encompassing definition of a cohesive society as one “that works towards the well-being of all its members, fights exclusion and marginalisation, creates a sense of belonging, promotes trust, and offers its members the opportunity of upward social mobility.”⁹

In numerous analyses of social cohesion, ethnic, linguistic, religious and other forms of diversity are treated as threats to social cohesion because they are viewed as almost inevitably inhibiting trust or cooperation among members of a society.¹⁰ But this is not the case for all uses of the social cohesion concept. Thus there are possibilities for work on pluralism, as undertaken by the Global Centre for Pluralism (GCP), to intersect with some approaches to the concept of social cohesion. This paper’s mapping exercise seeks to explore these intersections. The first section briefly presents the definition and approach to pluralism informing the Pluralism Lens, which defines pluralism as “an ethic of respect that values human diversity.”¹¹ Subsequent sections review the concept of social cohesion as deployed, in particular, by a number of international and inter-governmental organizations and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) that operate in the same general areas as the GCP. The accent, then, is primarily on the

Global South, although important work on the North is also included.

This mapping overview locates each concept in a number of “pathways” of development. For the GCP, pluralism is an outcome, “a choice” made within diverse societies. Practices generate the ethic of pluralism. These are practices of institutions as well as groups and individuals. In some uses of social cohesion, we can observe a similar structure of the argument: social cohesion is the product of conditions or practices. Thus, for the Bertelsmann Stiftung, “in modern societies, social cohesion is only possible if people are able to deal appropriately with diversity...social cohesion is reflected in a constructive approach to diversity.”¹² Other analyses, however, develop their interest in or understanding of social cohesion differently, being primarily interested in what social cohesion does, what its consequences are. Thus, for the OECD, “social cohesion is a valuable goal in itself and contributes to maintaining long-term economic growth.”¹³

We can label these uses “the drivers of social cohesion” and “social cohesion as driver of positive outcomes.”¹⁴ The first set can be expected to be closer to the GCP’s use of the concept of pluralism precisely because the analytic spotlight is on the outcome. Nonetheless, in some of the GCP’s work we also find claims for “pluralism as driver” of well-being, and thus this comparison to the alternate use of social cohesion can also be made. By examining the two sets of claims about social cohesion, the goal is to conclude where the concept of pluralism might contribute or add value to the work of these fields of practice through identifying areas of intersection.

II. PLURALISM: THE WORKING CONCEPT OF THE GLOBAL CENTRE FOR PLURALISM

The concept of pluralism has an intellectual history almost as disputed as that of social cohesion. In the 20th century, the term “plural society” was applied to parts of Southeast Asia where both Dutch and British colonialism had encouraged immigration (usually from other parts of Asia) for commercial or agricultural development. The classic examples for this literature are Chinese merchants but also South Asian, often Muslim, workers who built what is now Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia.¹⁵ The “plural society” concept was also applied to East Africa where Asian and other immigrant populations had been encouraged or pressured to settle by colonial powers.

This history of population movement structured social relations that became criss-crossed by multiple dimensions of social difference, including religion, ethnic origin, language and economic power. In the latter part of the 20th century, the concept of “diversity” or “diverse societies” replaced that of plural societies, but the meaning is very similar. Population flows, driven by voluntary and involuntary immigration, have created societies in which multiple dimensions of diversity structure social relations, including in societies whose citizens are descended from long-established indigenous peoples. Such structuring was also the consequence of map drawing by ex-colonial powers at the time of decolonization. Post-colonial state boundaries and borders drawn—with little respect for the territory occupied by ethnic groups—created new states in Africa and Asia that then had to confront the

challenges of governing several ethnic groups in a single country.¹⁶

The definition of pluralism as an “ethic of respect that values human diversity” means that for successful pluralism to work it must overcome division and conflict, and ensure inclusion and participation. Pluralism is never the same thing as diversity: its definition rests on a generalized belief in the value of diversity being promoted and protected by legal and political institutions and leaders. The GCP identifies the drivers of successful pluralism as being “hardware” and “software.” Both are important. Hardware is institutions, such as constitutions, legislatures, courts, schools and the media. These formal institutions define the legal and political space within which members of society act. Software is made up of cultural habits or cultural norms, such as conceptions of national identity and historic narratives that shape perceptions of who belongs to any society and influences everyday interactions as well as policy choices.¹⁷

In summary, the GCP’s position is that pluralism is an ethical commitment to both respect and value rather than downplaying or eliminating diversity in representations and practices. Successful pluralism involves equal participation of persons from all cultural, linguistic and religious groups; avoids exclusion based on difference in diverse societies and promotes inclusion; minimizes the resort to violence as a mechanism for conflict resolution; and includes promoting notions of shared citizenship. The way to achieve these characteristics and advantages of pluralism is to develop and ensure the maintenance of the “hardware” of legal and political institutions (including civic associations) committed to and

active in the dissemination of the ethic of pluralism. It also requires attention to the “software,” particularly social norms and values that respect social diversity. The practices generating such results can occur in a variety of economic, political and social domains that intersect on the pathways towards pluralism.¹⁸

The next section examines the extent to which organizations engaged in promoting social cohesion share these principles, although they may wrap them in different conceptual apparatus.

III. SOCIAL COHESION AS DRIVER OF POSITIVE OUTCOMES

The range of uses of social cohesion in this category is large. The perspective that social cohesion generates positive outcomes is found in the area of health research (both the social determinants of health and public health). It is used by organizations working in post-conflict situations, and is deployed by organizations focused on social development, whether in “fragile states” or not. As well, it is worth noting that although social cohesion is identified as the key ingredient in assuring health, peace and development, the actual analysis tends to focus on the absence of social cohesion and treats consequences arising from this missing phenomenon. There are fewer studies that actually document what social cohesion does than there are postulating the need to create more cohesion in order to achieve a particular and desirable outcome.

Social Cohesion Drives Good Health Outcomes

The World Health Organization (WHO) and its affiliated agencies have been considering the effects of social cohesion on health for a number of years. This interest reflects a tradition in academic research of assessing the impact of social cohesion—or more notably, its absence—for health outcomes. In the 1990s and 2000s, the argument that social cohesion (usually defined as “trust”) mediated the much-observed relationship between income inequalities and poor health was advanced by Richard Wilkinson, promoted by several researchers and debated by yet others.¹⁹ This has been described as a neo-Durkheimian research program because of its emphasis on social relations via “the attribution of the effects of income inequality on population health to the breakdown of social cohesion (e.g., cooperation, reciprocity, trust, civic participation).”²⁰ In other words, where social relations among individuals had deteriorated, it was possible to see a correlation with poorer health outcomes.²¹

In its path-breaking report, *Closing the Gap*, the WHO’s Commission on the Social Determinants of Health gestured towards this debate, and positioned social cohesion as one of the factors that is causally aligned with good health outcomes, alongside material circumstances, psychosocial factors, (individual) behaviours and biological factors.²² In this model, social cohesion and inequities in health outcomes are negatively correlated. In such work, the factors driving good health—and thus including social cohesion—are both individual and collective. National governmental and global institutions

as well as civil society organizations are assigned significant responsibility for “closing the gap” by ensuring that daily living conditions are improved and by ensuring more equitable distribution of power, money and resources.²³ Nonetheless, the absence of any clear definition or specification of what social cohesion actually is allows it to be deployed in a very vague way.

Social Cohesion Drives Peace and Reduces Violence

In a Middle East riven by, among other things, the Syrian conflict and massive refugee movement, the 3RP (Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan) brought together strategic actions developed in collaboration with international agencies “under the leadership of national authorities—namely, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Republic of Iraq, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Lebanese Republic and the Republic of Turkey—to ensure protection, humanitarian assistance and strengthen resilience.”²⁴ The plans’ starting principle was that social cohesion, if correctly promoted, would improve conditions of resilience and peaceful coexistence:

Households, communities and societies that are resilient are able to withstand shocks and stresses, and to work with national and local administrative institutions to achieve lasting transformative change. In the countries and communities affected by the refugee crisis, such cohesion needs to be fostered and developed to reduce the incidence and risk of local violence or larger conflict.²⁵

The mechanisms to do so were “social cohesion interventions.” They often targeted specifically the local level of government, where the risk of conflict was high.²⁶ Such projects usually involved interventions that brought members of different communities together to discuss problems and identify solutions or, as in the case of a Save the Children project, to have them work side-by-side in mixed groups.²⁷

Another example of the reliance on social cohesion mechanisms comes from the 2010–13 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) peace-building project with the government of Timor-Leste. The project focused on “social cohesion mechanisms” and direct delivery of services to communities, including by, among others, a Dialogue and Mediation Unit “to facilitate dialogue and mediation in communities identified as currently experiencing or vulnerable to conflict, and to seek increased understanding of its causes.” A second mechanism was the community strengthening unit “to facilitate interventions to build relationships and strengthen trust among community members through support for community-level activities.” A third was a training, monitoring and evaluation unit to strengthen the capacity “for conflict resolution and strengthening social cohesion through delivering training programs, monitoring, assessing and reporting on results” in the government and local communities.²⁸

There is an affinity between this attention to social cohesion interventions and recent work by the World Bank that treats social cohesion as a driver for overcoming fragility in post-conflict settings. In such situations the expectation, as summarized by

Elizabeth King, is that “by improving public goods provision or enhancing cohesion, CDR [community driven reconstruction] may reduce the risk of renewed conflict by lessening local grievances or facilitating economic development, which may in turn reduce the incentives to participate in violence.”²⁹ For this work on fragile states, however, the World Bank differs from many other analysts by providing a clear definition of social cohesion:

The term social cohesion describes the nature and quality of relationships among people and groups in society, including the state. The constituency of social cohesion is complex, but at its essence social cohesion implies a convergence across groups in society that provides a framework within which groups can, at a minimum, coexist peacefully. In this way, social cohesion offers a measure of predictability to interactions across people and groups, which in turn provides incentives for collective action.³⁰

In this definition we find that the presence of social cohesion enables collective action and decision-making, whereas its absence or fragility hinders such necessary aspects of living together. It shares the notion present in early health studies as well as in early work by the World Bank that social cohesion is primarily about connections among individuals. Where ties are many and structured, social cohesion will be greater.³¹

The Club de Madrid, under its Shared Society theme, uses a similar understanding of social cohesion as social capital, defined as trust, that drives positive economic outcomes.³² Thus, “a Shared Society is a

socially cohesive society; one in which people trust each other.”³³ A Shared Society research paper presents social cohesion in relationship to economic growth. The definition of social cohesion can be teased out from the following quote:

The political costs of group-based violence are clear. Less clear, until now, have been the economic costs...societies with lower social trust experienced lower economic growth during the subsequent decade...social crime and mistrust indicators show that societies with low social cohesion stagnated economically in the 1990s... Failure to confront group-based grievances, build social cohesion and establish the rule of law is not simply a political threat, but also a threat to prosperity.³⁴

For these analyses, social cohesion is trust and trust drives economic growth.

Social Cohesion and Effective Institutions

Work begun at the World Bank at the end of the 1990s focused on social cohesion differently than the position referenced in Section III’s discussion of social cohesion driving peace and reducing violence. In general, the position can be associated with significant attention to formal institutions, especially state institutions, and little concern with local and civil society. Social cohesion had consequences for institutional capacity and through that, to economic development. Jo Ritzen, a World Bank vice-president, summarized the claim: “It is my contention that a country’s social cohesion—contributing to the inclusiveness of its communities *and* responsive political institutions—

has a vitally important role in managing the effectiveness of that country's policy response to the vagaries of the global economy.”³⁵ This position informed the *World Development Reports (WDRs)* of 2000 and 2001.³⁶

Eventually, the arguments were summarized in an intricate set of claims in William Easterly, Jo Ritzen and Michael Woolcock's 2006 article on social cohesion, effective institutions and economic growth.³⁷ The focus here is on finding characteristics of cohesive societies that allow policy choices that will promote economic growth. In essence, the claim about the causal chain is that social cohesion helps sustain institutions which can then lead to good policy:

A country's social cohesion is essential for generating the confidence and patience needed to implement reforms: citizens have to trust the government that the short-term losses inevitably arising from reform will be more than offset by long-term gains...We argue that the strength of institutions itself may be, in part, determined by social cohesion. If this is so, we propose that key development outcomes (the most widely available being “economic growth”) should be more likely to be associated with countries governed by effective public institutions, and that those institutions, in turn, should be more likely to be found in socially cohesive societies.³⁸

In this research report, social cohesion was indicated by two measures: income inequality and ethnic fractionalization. The conclusion is that there is a strong inverse correlation between good institutional performance and inequality and fractionalization

(the factors inhibiting cohesion). More broadly, in the series of texts that generated Easterly, Ritzen and Woolcock's 2006 publication,³⁹ the claim was that an inclusive society, characterized by social cohesion, was the best foundation for economic growth: “an inclusive economy and society requires a serious commitment to building and maintaining social cohesion. It matters in all countries and for all members of society, especially the poor, and their prospects of living with a sense of empowerment, security and opportunity.”⁴⁰ This attention to social inclusion alongside cohesion became a defining characteristic of much work on social development.⁴¹


Social Cohesion, Social Inclusion and Social Development

Recent work by the World Bank and the OECD exemplify this linking of social cohesion and inclusion as a foundation for development. Looking at the improving possibilities for growth, the OECD, as already noted, used a broad definition.⁴² It generated a wide-ranging (and often cited) list of qualities of cohesion (i.e., what it accomplishes) that was modelled in recognition of interactions on the pathways of social cohesion. “Social cohesion is both a means to development and an end in itself, and is shaped by a society's preferences, history and culture.”⁴³ In this analysis, then, attention goes not only to the consequences of a cohesive society but also to the factors that work to make it cohesive.

At the same moment, the *WDR 2013* identified social cohesion as one of the pillars of development, building also on the notion of interactions along pathways between social cohesion and jobs, and vice versa.⁴⁴ For this analysis, the World Bank

proposes both individual-level indicators—trust and civic engagement—and a country-level indicator of the capacity for successful decision-making.⁴⁵ The second continues the emphasis on institutions, although the bulk of empirical analysis actually focuses on the individual-level indicators. Most important for this paper's purpose, however, is the construction of Figure 1. Social cohesion is depicted as a driver of development, but “jobs” are identified as the key causal factor.⁴⁶

Figure 1



In this *WDR*, jobs are the foundation to ensuring inclusion and for fostering social cohesion. A range of data are presented to support claims that jobs promote inter-ethnic and inter-group contact and that they also stimulate participation in other kinds of institutions, including those responsible for building interpersonal trust.

Overall, social inclusion is gaining more attention. Two examples are relevant here. The UN's Sustainable Development Goals for 2030, adopted in 2015, include dimensions that clearly touch on social inclusion, including gender equality, decent work, no poverty, and “peace, justice and strong institutions.”⁴⁷ This formulation of inclusive societies resonates with the increasing attention to “inclusive growth” as a goal for the Global North as much as the Global South. Traditional actors in the field of development deploy the concept of inclusive growth but now so too do the OECD and the European Union (EU) with respect to their own members as well as in their development work.⁴⁸

The argument that the benefits of employment go beyond the income generated for individuals are not *sui generis* to the World Bank, to one *WDR* or to the OECD. The 3RP plan for 2016–17 places access to income at the centre of any strategy for building resilience in the Middle East, and essentially transforms the discussion of social cohesion from one about inter-group dialogue to one of “livelihoods and social cohesion.” Thus, it affirms that

overall objectives for the livelihoods and social cohesion/stabilization sector in the five 3RP countries include creating the necessary conditions and environment for job creation while enhancing existing systems and promoting social cohesion and community integration initiatives at the community and municipal levels.⁴⁹

The community initiatives highlighted are essentially service provision. Providing services depends on having real institutional capacity.

SECTION III OVERVIEW

We see in these recent discussions of the role of social cohesion in development, as well as elsewhere, several important adjustments have taken place in the use of the concept.

- First is that this literature continues to see diversity and diverse societies as threats that need to be managed by successful social cohesion interventions in order to achieve the promised outcomes of social cohesion. In these analyses, diversity and the assumed concomitant lack of trust and social capital is problematic, and there is little attention to diversity as a good to be respected.
- Second is that social inclusion appears to be trumping social cohesion in the vocabulary of international policy communities. This provides a clear intersection with the GCP's attention to inclusive citizenship and the key contributions of the economic domain on successful pathways to pluralism.
- The increasing emphasis on formal institutions for social development is also in line with the GCP's work on the hardware of pluralism. Indeed, a third adjustment within policy communities using the concept of social cohesion is the identification of institutional capacity as an important factor for achieving desired outcomes, whether with respect to fragile states or not. This emphasis on well-functioning institutions, including municipal and state institutions, is an important theme after several decades of domination by critiques of public authority and state action.

- Fourth, in the recent literature, if social cohesion matters it is because, even more than inter-group circumstances, social cohesion is an intervening factor between access to employment—the “jobs” in the Section III's Figure 1—and social development. Put succinctly, social cohesion is not fostered by “dialogue” as much as it is the result of successful living together. Social cohesion has become practice. Indeed, this position downplays the very notion that social cohesion is a driver, and looks more to the drivers of social cohesion.

IV. THE DRIVERS OF SOCIAL COHESION

This section reviews approaches that seek to understand social cohesion as an outcome, and as such intersects significantly with the GCP's concern for how pluralism is created and maintained. The search for the foundations of social cohesion is also widespread, generating a number of different approaches. Again, and as in the previous section, there is more emphasis on what hinders social cohesion than on what actually brings it into existence.

This section can be subdivided into approaches that stress values, including definitions of citizenship, as the grounding for weaker or stronger social cohesion; those that claim successful management of diversity fosters social cohesion; and those that see social cohesion as the result of policies designed to achieve other goals for social development. Because the interventions and initiatives as well as academic literature on this pathway are numerous,⁵⁰ for the

purposes of this mapping exercise, the examples chosen include organizations operating in the same general areas as the GCP.

Shared Values Drive Social Cohesion

Within this category there are several different stances, but in essence they come down to the position that cohesion results from acceptance of common values. Policy domains such as education have been identified as particularly useful for teaching the values and practices of “living together.” If in many contemporary cases the goal is to teach the normality and advantages of valuing societal diversity, historically it has been more common to insist that citizenship education depends on teaching a set of shared values that will provide the foundation for social cohesion.

An emphasis on shared values has deep roots in European societies divided by religious belief and language, and has shaped theories of social cohesion. For example, between 1894 and 1906 France was deeply divided over the Dreyfus Affair. This profound cultural and political conflict starkly divided Catholics and “traditionalist-monarchs” from republicans, who promoted their values, including secularism (*laïcité*), in their support for Dreyfus and opposition to the anti-Semitism driving the Affair.⁵¹ Émile Durkheim, one of the first to use the concept of social cohesion, intervened on the side of the republicans, in the name of reason and a modern “moral individualism.” This was an early manifestation of what are now identified as republican notions of social cohesion, which treat it as essentially voluntarist and political, with ties

based on sharing fundamental values and practices of participation.

Over time, however, despite a certain level of agreement on the importance of values, there is much less agreement about whether they must be the same (sometimes labelled fundamental) or whether the shared values can be simply commitments to practice. This distinction creates what Keith Banting describes as two models of integration. One “sees social cohesion as flowing from elements of a common culture, including a common sense of identity and shared cultural values. Here, the essential question is ‘Who are we?’” A second approach “argues that a commitment to democratic rights and participation is the key to an integrated society. Here the key question is...‘How are we to live together?’”⁵² In both cases, values drive social cohesion because even the second requires, at a minimum, “acceptance of the legitimacy of such differences, and agreement on the institutions and procedures through which we manage.”⁵³

Attention to values characterized the treatment of social cohesion by the Council of Europe (CoE) for many years.⁵⁴ In an important 2001 strategic announcement, the CoE stated that

social cohesion, as defined by the Directorate General of Social Cohesion of the Council of Europe, is a concept that includes values and principles which aim to ensure that all citizens, without discrimination and on an equal footing, have access to fundamental social and economic rights.⁵⁵

In 2004, the CoE offered its definition—or understanding—of social cohesion, saying “as understood by the Council of Europe, social cohesion is the capacity of a society to ensure the welfare of all its members, minimizing disparities and avoiding polarization. A cohesive society is a mutually supportive community of free individuals pursuing these common goals by democratic means.”⁵⁶ Shared values were important for achieving such cohesion.⁵⁷ This pathway ranged from recognition of cultural diversity via rights to reasonable accommodation to promotion of respect for diversity via the education system and values promoted in curricula. In other words, diversity was not a threat if it was managed well, and even more importantly for the CoE, diversity merited recognition.

A similar focus, developed in collaboration with the CoE, has been inserted into the joint work undertaken by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OCSE) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) on educational interventions to counter intolerance and discrimination against Muslims.⁵⁸

This reasoning also informed *Our Shared Future*, the Commission on Integration and Cohesion’s final report, which analyzed the English situation. Established in 2006, the Commission’s mandate was to consider how local areas can make the most of the benefits delivered by increasing diversity—and also to consider how they can respond to the tensions it can sometimes cause. It was tasked with developing practical approaches to building communities’ own capacity to prevent and manage tensions.⁵⁹ Chaired by Darra Singh, chief executive of Ealing Council, it did not employ the concept of social cohesion,

preferring instead to focus on “community cohesion” and identifying the local scale and local authorities as key actors in ensuring successful integration and cohesion. Instead of “shared values,” the report called for the consolidation of more general beliefs. First was acceptance that there would be a shared future, emphasizing bonds within communities rather than differences. Second was a new model of rights and responsibilities for 21st-century citizenship. A third emphasis on values came with the call for an “ethic of hospitality,” grounded in “mutual respect and civility.” And finally came familiar tropes of equality, social justice and trust in institutions.⁶⁰ *Our Shared Future* was important because it moved beyond the rigid stance of the 2001 Cantle Report that examined outbreaks of violence in English cities, although the former continued to use the keyword introduced by the latter—“community cohesion”—thereby emphasizing values as well as practices.⁶¹

Following directly and quickly on *Our Shared Future*, schools were officially assigned the “new duty to promote community cohesion” in 2007, and provided with a definition identifying values that would improve “living together”:

By community cohesion, we mean working towards a society in which there is a *common vision and sense of belonging* by all communities; a society in which the diversity of people’s backgrounds and circumstances is appreciated and valued; a society in which similar *life opportunities* are available to all; and a society in which strong and positive relationships exist and continue to be developed in the workplace, in schools and in the wider community.⁶²

The attention to fostering shared values as a foundation for social cohesion is also present in the World Bank's work on social cohesion cited earlier. The "convergence" that social cohesion is meant to generate must be based on drivers of social cohesion:

Convergence across groups that is based on shared intersubjective meanings facilitates social cohesion. Intersubjective meanings encompass beliefs of individuals, communities, and societies about themselves, how the world works, and their own agency in confronting change and making decisions that affect their own lives... It does not mean that all people need to believe the same things and behave in the same way, but that at least a minimum of overlap should exist between various meaning systems, and that people's understandings of the world and the behavior that comes with it must have some elements of compatibility.⁶³

The Social Cohesion Radar developed by the Bertelsmann Stiftung, and covering 34 members of the EU and OECD, similarly emphasizes "the ideational and relational nature of social cohesion,"⁶⁴ by explicitly rejecting the need for—or even advantages of—sociological homogeneity:

Our approach specifically avoids equating cohesion and homogeneity—in terms of the distribution of wealth, the religious and ethnic makeup of the population, or values. We believe that a homogeneity-based model is outdated and fails to account for the reality of diverse and complex societies...Our definition, which allows for heterogeneity, also means that cohesion

among the majority must not be achieved by excluding minorities.⁶⁵

Concretely, and in an analysis of the 16 German *Länder* (provinces), the results of the Social Cohesion Radar found that social cohesion was stronger in wealthier and urban areas, and, in general, "in contrast to what is commonly believed, ethnic diversity is not a threat to cohesiveness."⁶⁶ Similar results emerge from the broad international comparison, which is framed in part as an explicit refutation of Robert Putnam's assertion of the dangers of diversity and of economists' reliance on ethnic fractionalization as an assumed hindrance to social cohesion.⁶⁷ With such an approach, the Social Cohesion Radar leaves to empirical analysis the types and amount of value consensus needed as grounding for social cohesion, just as the GCP's definition of pluralism asks empirically about whether in any particular society diversity is treated as a value or a problem to be managed.

We see then that a similar caveat about not requiring, or imposing, homogeneity of values is present in all four of the main sources cited above. Consensus seems to exist. However, the difficult question about "how much" agreement and "whose values" continues to plague notions of social cohesion founded on shared values.⁶⁸

Social Cohesion via Policies to Manage Diversity

The next set of claims about the drivers of social cohesion is well-known to the Global Centre for Pluralism, in large part because it is associated with work on policies of multiculturalism originating

in Canada. The claim is that a pathway to social cohesion follows from public policies intended to manage diversity. Will Kymlicka summarizes multiculturalism policies (abbreviated as MCP) by saying the term covers a wide range of policies, but what they have in common is that they go beyond the protection of the basic civil and political rights guaranteed to all individuals in a liberal-democratic state to also extend some level of public recognition and support for minorities to express their distinct identities and practices.⁶⁹

Many identify such policies as having helped countries avoid the conflictual and often violent clashes associated with mobilized differences, to achieve social cohesion.⁷⁰ Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau expressed this belief in the role of public policy in November 2015:

Canada has learned how to be strong not in spite of our differences, but because of them, and going forward, that capacity will be at the heart of both our success, and of what we offer the world. Our commitment to diversity and inclusion isn't about Canadians being nice and polite—though of course we are. In fact, this commitment is a powerful and ambitious approach to making Canada, and the world, a better, and safer, place.⁷¹

This belief that multicultural policies foster social cohesion is not shared by all. For example, in fall 2015 German Chancellor Angela Merkel labelled multiculturalism “a sham,” a claim that repeated her 2010 pronouncement that it had “utterly failed.”⁷² What she meant by multiculturalism—practices that allowed immigrants to live their

lives in parallel to other Germans—was not what is usually meant by multiculturalism policies’ contribution to social cohesion, of course.⁷³ However, so discredited now is multiculturalism as a policy perspective in much of Europe that the CoE has abandoned the term and selected the concept of “interculturalism” instead.⁷⁴ In 2008, a CoE White Paper called for policies promoting intercultural dialogue, with the policy advocated as “a powerful instrument of mediation and reconciliation: through critical and constructive engagement across cultural fault-lines, it addresses real concerns about social fragmentation and insecurity while fostering integration and social cohesion.”⁷⁵ By 2015, the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Intercultural Integration recommended that member states enable their cities to follow the “urban model of intercultural integration,” including its tools for implementation and evaluation, in part because “a solid body of research both in Europe and worldwide has demonstrated the value of diversity for human and social development and cohesion, economic growth, productivity, creativity and innovation and that these benefits of diversity can only be realised on condition that adequate policies are in place to prevent conflict and foster equal opportunities and social cohesion.”⁷⁶ This recommendation was the follow-up to an initiative on intercultural cities co-sponsored by the CoE and the EU several years earlier. In other words, for these two large European bodies, the policy interventions for intercultural practice take place increasingly at the local level because “cities are at the front line of integration and diversity management.”⁷⁷ Social cohesion can be built, according to these claims, even in the most cosmopolitan and seemingly least

rooted settings that are contemporary urban areas, if the right policies are in place.

Fostering Social Cohesion via Policies for Social Development

In this third set of approaches, which may be the most prevalent at this point in time, the pathways to social cohesion are complex. In Section III's discussion of social cohesion, social inclusion and social development, rising attention to "livelihoods" and to jobs (formal and informal) as the pathway to social cohesion was noted. Examining these approaches in more detail here, we find approaches targeting social development are now identifying social cohesion as one positive outcome of work, employment and jobs. In such formulations of pathways to well-being, social cohesion is frequently only a station along the way to another end, and its separate contribution may be quite minor.

The EU was ahead of the others with this approach, in part because it has quite a particular approach to "cohesion." For the EU, the concept has long meant "social cohesion funds" intended to enable development towards European norms in less wealthy member states and regions. More broadly, the social policy agenda is also part of this approach, in the sense that cohesion is sought via the eradication of poverty and social exclusion as well as the modernization of social protection, all of which require social investment, activation of the labour force and a higher employment rate to generate social inclusion.⁷⁸

Increasingly, however, other organizations are identifying economic and social inequalities as both

hindering social cohesion and creating the need for direct interventions. The OECD, which relaunched itself onto the terrain of social cohesion recently, did so by laying out a model emphasizing widely available public services for health and education as drivers of social cohesion (understood here as common norms):

Growth and development help maintain and enhance social cohesion. For example, greater available public resources can be used to support more inclusive health and education programmes, while better education can, in turn, strengthen participation in decision making and reinforce the sense of belonging to a community. In fact, in addition to determining growth, public education also indirectly reduces income inequalities and instils common norms.⁷⁹

This shift is also visible in the work of the World Bank, which has focused its discussions of social cohesion on work in the *WDR 2013*, linking jobs to development as shown in Section III's Figure 1, and with social cohesion being one of the intermediary routes on this longer pathway. In this analysis, if social cohesion contributed to development, jobs were the driving force for enabling social cohesion as well as the other drivers of development.

The UNDP took up the theme again with its 2015 Human Development Report, *Work for Human Development*. With this focus on work (paid and unpaid, formal and informal, etc.), social cohesion is present but not the centrepiece. It is one of the positive outcomes: "Work provides livelihoods, income, a means for participation and connectedness, social cohesion, and human

dignity.”⁸⁰ In a speech introducing the report, the lead author opened by stating, “work is the defining issue of our time...The 2030 Development Agenda, which the world has recently agreed upon, is linked to the issue of work.”⁸¹ While much of the report focuses on rethinking “what work is,” it makes an explicit link to the situation of conflict and post-conflict situations in this way, as well as giving several examples of how to achieve the ends of social cohesion in such situations: “In conflict and post-conflict situations it is important to focus on productive jobs that empower people, build agency, provide access to voice, offer social status and increase respect, cohesion, trust and people’s willingness to participate in civil society.”⁸²

A similar reorientation can be seen in the 3RP project in the Middle East. It moved its plan for 2016–17 toward a chapter on livelihoods and jobs, in which work of all kinds was discussed as fostering social cohesion, but attention to social cohesion was decidedly secondary.⁸³ This was a shift from even a year earlier, when supporting social cohesion had its own chapter.⁸⁴

SECTION IV OVERVIEW

A number of generalizations emerge from this brief consideration of the drivers of social cohesion.

- Currently, when shared values are identified as important drivers both organizations working in the North and those of the Global South identify values in broad rather than narrow and limited ways. The values are both general (an ethic of hospitality) and likely to include valuing diversity

(an ethic of respect). These formulations clearly accord with the GCP’s definition of pluralism as an ethic of respect that values human diversity.

- “Multiculturalism” as a concept and as a policy is now widely contested. While it is not an explicit element of the presentation of pluralism by the GCP, the skepticism that multiculturalism can be a successful driver of social cohesion and the turn to other concepts—such as interculturalism—suggest caution in deployment of concepts.
- This section has also found that social cohesion per se may be on another of its periodic downswings in popularity. One indicator is the spread of the concept of community cohesion, including the emphasis on the local level of government and service delivery, from the United Kingdom into European bodies. A second sign is the treatment of social cohesion as one of many way stations on the pathway of development—economic, human and social. The necessary gesture to cohesion is present, but jobs and livelihoods have gained much greater prominence. This is also the case in the Pluralism Lens developed by the GCP, which identifies livelihoods as one of the main domains for instituting pluralism.
- All of these analyses, although often stressing shared values (the “software”) and contact among groups and individuals, assign public institutions, including those of civil society (the “hardware”), a role in ensuring social cohesion is fostered and protected. Approaches to social cohesion as an outcome assign responsibilities to governments at all levels. This is particularly explicit with respect to multiculturalism and intercultural policies as

well as with the emphasis on limiting inequalities, social exclusion and discrimination.

V. CONCLUSION: INTERSECTIONS AND COLLABORATIONS?

The two previous sections have been organized around the notion that, just as for pluralism in the eyes of the GCP, action research focused on social cohesion sometimes treats it as a driver of well-being and sometimes focuses on the drivers of social cohesion. However, this binary classification has been hard to maintain, as is the difficulty of associating the GCP with only one pathway. One reason for the difficulty is that the interests of any organization change, depending on the circumstances or situation. The goal at times may be to understand what social cohesion and pluralism do, but at others it may be more important to understand what fosters social cohesion and pluralism. Beyond such normal adjustments, however, there is a growing tendency to downplay the autonomy of social cohesion effects and consequences (described in Sections III and IV).

Three sources of this tendency can be identified from this paper's mapping exercise. First, social cohesion is increasingly treated as an intermediate (and relatively underanalyzed) factor on the pathway to well-being. Recent analyses of social development focused on jobs and work are examples of this, as is the mounting attention to inclusive growth.⁸⁵ Social cohesion is situated between earlier causal factors and a particular positive outcome.

Second, this paper pointed out a tendency simply to insert "social cohesion" in a list of positive phenomena expected to result from a particular action or intervention, or more usually, a list of negative phenomena threatening a particular situation due to the absence of cohesion. The WHO's gesture toward social cohesion in its modelling of the social determinants of health provides one example among many.⁸⁶ Reliance on an underdefined or undefined conceptualization of social cohesion no doubt follows from its status as a quasi-concept. Such concepts are hybrids, used for theoretical and empirical work in the academy but also deployed in policy discourse and analysis. Their value is in their capacity to bridge both academic and policy research. Their disadvantage is that their very definition and use is not stabilized; they are used in a variety of ways to serve a range of purposes. Social cohesion, along with a number of other popular terms such as social inclusion, social capital or inclusive growth, are quasi-concepts used to enable engagement across widely varying policy communities.⁸⁷ They are useful as such, but the other side of the coin is their lack of precision. When efforts are made to measure and provide indicators of the concept, the definition either becomes very narrow or exceedingly general and broad. The first result was observed in Easterly, Ritzen and Woolcock's 2006 article in which "ethnic fractionalization"—usually understood as a challenge to social cohesion—was used as one proxy for social cohesion itself.⁸⁸ The second result characterizes the Bertelsmann Stiftung's Social Cohesion Radar which identifies three domains and nine dimensions of social cohesion, using up to 11 indicators for each dimension.⁸⁹ As the authors themselves readily acknowledge, there is

no agreement about either the indicators chosen for each dimension or even the nine dimensions themselves. While the authors do generate scores across countries and time periods, other analysts argue that the index includes either things it is trying to explain or things better explained differently.⁹⁰ No consensus exists.

A third source of this tendency to move away from treating social cohesion either as a cause or an effect results from a more systematic analytic approach to analyzing the quality of societies, and it is here that there is the greatest potential for intersections between analyses deploying a social cohesion approach and the conceptualization of a Pluralism Lens. Three examples of this analytic approach to the quality of a society are now widely cited in the periodic censuses of social cohesion. One is the CoE's definition of a cohesive society, cited previously: "A cohesive society is a mutually supportive community of free individuals pursuing these common goals by democratic means."⁹¹ The Club de Madrid asserts "a shared society as one in which all individuals and constituent groups hold status as equally contributing participants, free to express their differences while integrating their voices within the broader population" and "shared societies are stable, safe and just."⁹² For the OECD, a cohesive society "works toward the well-being of all its members, fights exclusion and marginalisation, creates a sense of belonging, promotes trust, and offers its members the opportunity of upward social mobility."⁹³

All of these portraits of the quality of society seek interactions rather than linear pathways. The OECD represents this tendency most clearly when it

provides the diagram linking the three components in Figure 2. It seeks to provide a tool to examine social cohesion as "both a means to development and an end in itself."⁹⁴ Gone is the linearity of the *WDR 2013*'s discussion of causation (Figure 1).

Figure 2



Instead of linearity, this is an interactive model with a holistic approach.

The GCP's Pluralism Lens also seeks to provide such a holistic approach to pluralism, rather than identifying a single linear pathway. Thus, the potential intersection with recent approaches to social cohesion is evident. In addition, in doing so, the GCP brings forward its expertise on analyzing the interlinkage of institutions (hardware) that support or undermine pluralism and the cultural norms and values (software) that strengthen or weaken the ethic of respect that values human diversity.

Beyond this approach to causality, the most convincing analyses of social cohesion are those that see it as an outcome, whether final or intermediary, and assign public and third-sector institutions roles in safeguarding it. Those that simply emphasize social relations (such as "trust")

or social cleavages (labelled “diversity”) have given way to more nuanced approaches. In doing so, the notion that diversity is a danger because it is negatively correlated with social cohesion has been rejected by those who assert the need for respect of difference (such as institutions providing multicultural and intercultural policies), but it has also been banished by empirical studies of the conditions in which social cohesion is stronger or weaker. For example, the Social Cohesion Radar identifies the sapping effects of high level of inequalities and low levels of social inclusion for social cohesion, and also has null results when it correlates social cohesion and immigration rates. Such findings direct analytic attention to the role of institutions in limiting inequalities and integrating immigrants as well as the power of values, as does the Pluralism Lens.

Finally, with respect to the popular approach to social cohesion that focuses on “social capital” (defined as trust), the GCP can provide leadership for moving it beyond its own limits.⁹⁵ Experts now agree that treating trust as the driver of social cohesion leaves underanalyzed the factors that drive trust. In the United States, for example, where generalized trust has declined over the last several decades, explanations range from rising economic inequality to political factors such as duplicity and uncivil discourse.⁹⁶ An additional factor often mentioned, following Robert Putnam, is “diversity.” Barbara Arneil provides a convincing argument that it is not diversity per se that shapes

trust, nor only economic inequalities (although she recognizes they must be considered). “The decline in trust over time of all Americans is also rooted in the politics of diversity,” in which claims-making by minorities of all kinds increased and sometimes provoked backlash even as it generated outcomes that increased their capacity to participate, their rights and their recognition.⁹⁷ Christel Kesler and Irene Bloemraad develop a similar argument about diversity (indicated by immigration) and cohesion, with data from 19 advanced industrial countries, with similar conclusions:

Our findings speak to a central theoretical claim: the need to take institutions seriously. Positing a general, negative relationship between diversity and collective-mindedness requires a universalist account of human behaviours and attitudes. Such an account, predicated on innate psychological traits, differential interests or fear of social change must be tempered by sociologists’ accumulated knowledge about how institutions and social context channel humans’ beliefs and actions.⁹⁸

Thus, they point us again to the importance of institutions—public, private and in civil society—and their practices for promoting both social cohesion and pluralism, and safeguarding norms of respect for difference, which the GCP sees as the software of pluralism. With this emphasis on both software and hardware, fruitful intersections between promotion of pluralism and social cohesion are clearly possible.

NOTES

- ¹ The *World Development Report 2013* asks “what is social cohesion” and before citing Durkheim, refers to 15th-century Muslim scholar Ibn Khaldun. Dragolov et al (2016) similarly attribute to Khaldun with a proposition that solidarity across groups promotes social integration. World Bank (2012), *World Bank 2013: Jobs* (Washington, DC: World Bank), 128; Georgi Dragolov, Zsófia Ignácz, Jan Lorenz, Regina Kuhl, Jan Delhey and Klaus Boehnke (2016), *Social Cohesion in the Western World—What Holds Societies Together: Insights From the Social Cohesion Radar*, SpringerBriefs in Well-Being and Quality of Life Research, 2; Émile Durkheim (1997 [1893]), *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York: Free Press).
- ² Dragolov et al (2016); Jane Jenson (1998), *Mapping Social Cohesion* (Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research Networks [CPRN]). http://oaresource.library.carleton.ca/cprn/15723_en.pdf
- ³ We adopt the notion of pathway from, among others, Andrew Norton and Arjan de Haan, as a substitute for the stronger notion of clear and unidirectional causality. Andrew Norton and Arjan de Haan (2012), “Social Cohesion: Theoretical Debates and Practical Applications With Respect to Jobs” (Washington, DC: World Bank), 2, accessed 30 November 2018, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/12147>.
- ⁴ Georgi Dragolov, Zsófia Ignácz, Jan Lorenz, Jan Delhey, and Klaus Boehnke (2013),

Social Cohesion Radar Measuring Common Ground: An International Comparison of Social Cohesion (Gütersloh, FRG: Bertelsmann Stiftung), 13–14, accessed 30 November 2018, http://www.gesellschaftlicher-zusammenhalt.de/fileadmin/Inhalte/Downloads_Sozialer%20Zusammenhalt/Radar_InternationalerVergleich_web_en.pdf.

- ⁵ David Schiefer and Jolanda van der Noll (2016), “The Essentials of Social Cohesion: A Literature Review,” *Social Indicators Research* 132 (2): 579–603, accessed 30 November 2018, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11205-016-1314-5>.
- ⁶ Andy Green, Jan Germen Janmaat and Christine Han present three “traditions” of social cohesion and three corresponding contemporary “regimes.” The concentration is on European-based societies, though some Asian traditions are also incorporated. Dragolov et al (2016) identify “six regimes of social cohesion.” Andy Green, Jan Germen Janmaat and Christine Han (2009), “Regimes of Social Cohesion,” LLAKES Research Paper No. 1, s. I–IV, accessed 30 November 2018, [http://www.ioe.ac.uk/study/documents/Regimes_of_Social_Cohesion_\(PDF_1\).pdf](http://www.ioe.ac.uk/study/documents/Regimes_of_Social_Cohesion_(PDF_1).pdf). See chapter 4 in Dragolov (2016). [http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1502909/1/Green2009Regimes\(Report\).pdf](http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1502909/1/Green2009Regimes(Report).pdf)
- ⁷ Alexandre Marc, Alys Willman, Ghazia Aslam, Michelle Rebosio, with Kanishka Balasuriya (2012), *Societal Dynamics and Fragility: Engaging Societies in Responding to Fragile Situations* (Washington, DC: World Bank), 15.

- ⁸ Club de Madrid (2011), “The Economies of Shared Societies,” Shared Societies Project Document Series No. 2 (Madrid: Club de Madrid), 37, accessed 3 December 2018, <http://www.clubmadrid.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/6.-Economics-of-SSP.pdf>.
- ⁹ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] (2011), *Perspectives on Global Development 2012: Social Cohesion in a Shifting World* (Paris: OECD Publishing), 51.
- ¹⁰ Robert Putnam’s conclusion that “immigration and ethnic diversity tend to reduce social solidarity and social capital” has been much cited as evidence that diversity is a threat to social cohesion. Putnam and his followers define social cohesion as social capital, by which they mean trust in others. Robert Putnam (2007), “*E Pluribus Unum*: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century. The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture,” *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30 (2): 137–74.
- ¹¹ Global Centre for Pluralism [CGP] (2012), “Defining Pluralism,” Pluralism Papers No. 1, January, 1–2, accessed 30 November 2018, https://www.pluralism.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/defining_pluralism_EN.pdf.
- ¹² Dragolov et al (2013), 15.
- ¹³ OECD (2011), 17.
- ¹⁴ These positions on social cohesion do not always neatly distinguish one organization from others. The same organization may sometimes use the

notion both ways, depending on the question being asked or the reason why the concept is being deployed. In addition, many arguments postulate bidirectional effects. The notion that social cohesion is treated sometimes as cause and sometimes as effect was developed in Caroline Beauvais and Jane Jenson (2002), “Social Cohesion: Updating the State of the Research,” Discussion Paper No.F|22 (Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research Networks [CPRN]), 5, 22. It was also taken up in Dragolov et al (2016), which is interested simultaneously in determinants and outcomes (p.60, c. 5). The causal discussion also appears in, among others, Norton and de Haan (2012, 4ff.) and OECD (2011). For a detailed and theoretically driven discussion of causality problems, see Noah E. Friedkin (2004), “Social Cohesion,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 30: 409–25. <https://catalogue.library.carleton.ca/record=b4305181>

- ¹⁵ For contemporary discussions of the ongoing challenges of such migration-generated diversity, see the Global Centre for Pluralism’s Change Cases by Hwok-Aun Lee (Malaysia) and Daniel Goh (Singapore). Hwok-Aun Lee (2017), “Majority Affirmative Action in Malaysia: Imperatives, Compromises and Challenges,” *Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies*, Global Centre for Pluralism, accessed 30 November 2018, https://www.pluralism.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Malaysia_EN.pdf; Daniel Goh (2017), “Diversity and Nation-Building in Singapore,” *Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies*, Global Centre for Pluralism, accessed 30 November 2018, https://www.pluralism.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Singapore_EN.pdf.

- ¹⁶ For contemporary discussions of two African cases and the ongoing challenges as well as some solutions, see the Global Centre for Pluralism's Change Cases by Daniel Agbiboa (Nigeria) and Abu Bakarr Bah (Côte d'Ivoire). Daniel Agbiboa (2017), "Federalism and Group-Based Inequalities in Nigeria," *Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies*, Global Centre for Pluralism, accessed 30 November 2018, https://www.pluralism.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Nigeria_EN.pdf; Abu Bakarr Bah (2017), "Seeking Democracy in Côte d'Ivoire: Overcoming Exclusionary Citizenship," *Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies*, Global Centre for Pluralism, accessed 30 November 2018, https://www.pluralism.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CotedIvoire_EN.pdf.
- ¹⁷ For more detailed analyses of the concepts of hardware and software, see the Global Centre for Pluralism's thematic overviews by Will Kymlicka and Jane Jenson as well as Neil DeVotta's use of hardware and software in his Sri Lankan Change Case. Will Kymlicka (2017), "The Hardware and Software of Pluralism," *Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies*, Global Centre for Pluralism, accessed 30 November 2018, https://www.pluralism.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/WillKymlicka_HardwareandSoftware_EN.pdf; Jane Jenson (2017), "Institutions: The Hardware of Pluralism," *Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies*, Global Centre for Pluralism, accessed 30 November 2018, https://www.pluralism.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/JaneJenson_Institutions_EN.pdf; Neil DeVotta (2017), "Majoritarian Politics in Sri Lanka: The Roots of Pluralism Breakdown," *Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies*, Global

Centre for Pluralism, accessed 30 November 2018, https://www.pluralism.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/SriLanka_EN.pdf.

¹⁸ Need a reference to the Lens document here if possible.

¹⁹ Richard Wilkinson (1996), *Unhealthy Societies: The Afflictions of Inequality* (London: Routledge).

²⁰ Carles Muntaner and John Lynch (1999), "Income Inequality, Social Cohesion and Class Relations: A Critique of Wilkinson's Neo-Durkheimian Research Program," *International Journal of Health Services* 29 (1): 60.

²¹ Simon Szreter and Michael Woolcock provide a useful overview of the positions, as well as the debate. Simon Szreter and Michael Woolcock (2004), "Health by Association? Social Capital, Social Theory and the Political Economy of Public Health," *International Journal of Epidemiology* 33 (4): 650–67.

²² Commission on Social Determinants of Health [CSDH] (2008), *Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health Equity Through Action on the Social Determinants of Health*, CSDH Final Report (Geneva: World Health Organization), 43. See also, World Health Organization [WHO] (2013), *Governance for Health Equity Taking Forward the Equity Values and Goals of Health 2020 in the WHO European Region* (Copenhagen: WHO Europe), 34.

²³ CSDH (2008), 2 and throughout.

- ²⁴ Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan in Response to the Syria Crisis [3RP], *Strategic Overview*, accessed 30 November 2018, <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/the-3rp/strategic-overview/>.
- ²⁵ Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan in Response to the Syria Crisis [3RP] (n.d. [2014]), *Regional Strategic Overview 2015–16*, 20, accessed 30 November 2018, <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/3RP-Report-Overview.pdf>.
- ²⁶ For example, the “Stabilization and Recovery Programme” (part of UNDP’s Peace Building in Lebanon Project) worked on fostering social cohesion in Lebanese refugee-receiving communities in West Bekaa. “The aim is to create local peacebuilding mechanisms to improve intercommunity relations both in terms of inter Lebanese relations and Lebanese Syrian interaction. For this purpose, the Project has identified a specific group from the seven targeted municipalities to determine the main conflict-driven topics in the area affecting intercommunity relations or social cohesion.” United Nations Lebanon, “Supporting Social Cohesion by Reducing Tensions,” accessed 30 November 2018, <http://www.un.org.lb/english/supporting-social-cohesion-by-reducing-tensions>.
- ²⁷ Save the Children’s Casual Labor Initiative “engaged over 8,000 Syrian Refugees and Lebanese nationals between November 2013 and January 2014, to collaboratively carry out public works in both Informal Tented Settlements (ITS) and surrounding host communities in 10

locations in Akkar and 30 locations in the Bekaa. The work was paid and lasted for 10 days over a period of one month. The works consisted of improvements to the community infrastructure and environment, including site improvements in ITS.” Charles Harb and Rim Saab (2014), *Social Cohesion and Intergroup Relations: Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Nationals in the Bekaa and Akkar*, Save the Children and the American University Beirut, Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP), 1 January, 4, accessed 30 November 2018, <https://www.alnap.org/help-library/social-cohesion-and-intergroup-relations-syrian-refugees-and-lebanese-nationals-in-the>.

- ²⁸ United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] (2011), *Support to the Department of Peace-Building and Social Cohesion in Timor-Leste*, UNDP Project Document, February, 8, accessed 30 November 2018, http://www.tl.undp.org/content/dam/timorleste/docs/reports/TL_CPR_DPBSCProDocFeb2011.pdf.
- ²⁹ Elizabeth King (2013), *A Critical Review of Community-Driven Development in Conflict-Affected Contexts* (London: DFID/International Rescue Committee), 15, accessed 30 November 2018, <http://gsdrc.org/document-library/a-critical-review-of-community-driven-development-programmes-in-conflict-affected-contexts/>.
- ³⁰ Marc et al (2012), 15.
- ³¹ Marc et al (2012), 3. This perspective arises more or less directly from a long-standing tradition

within some World Bank-connected research to treat social capital and social cohesion as virtual synonyms and then to see the presence of social capital as a driver of positive outcomes, most particularly development. For example, see Michael Woolcock and Deepa Narayan (2000), “Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research and Policy,” *World Bank Research Observer* 15 (2): 225–49.

³² In 2010, Club de Madrid launched the Shared Societies Project discussions with the question: “Economic Development and Social Cohesion: Incompatible or Interdependent Policies?” The goal was to “develop an economic argument for inclusion by analyzing the relationship between social cohesion, economic growth and well-being.” The findings were meant to be “made accessible and convincing to political leaders, effectuating political action.” Club de Madrid (2010), *Economic Development and Social Cohesion: Incompatible or Interdependent Policies?*, 28 June, accessed 30 November 2018, <http://www.clubmadrid.org/economic-development-and-social-cohesion-incompatible-or-interdependent-policies/>.

³³ Club de Madrid (2011), 37.

³⁴ Roberto Foa and Steen Lau Jorgensen (n.d. [2008]), “Defusing Collective Violence: The Economic Arguments,” Shared Societies Background Papers (Madrid: Club de Madrid), 38–39. See also, OECD (2011): “Social cohesion affects not only the rate, but the quality and the sustainability of growth, especially in the context of sharp, frequent changes in external conditions” (p.59).

³⁵ Italics in original. Jo Ritzen and Michael Woolcock (2000), “Social Cohesion, Public Policy and Economic Growth: Implications for Countries in Transition,” Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Paris, 26–28 June, 9, accessed 30 November 2018, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/914451468781802758/pdf/28741.pdf>.

³⁶ Ritzen and Woolcock (2000). 3.

³⁷ William Easterly, Jo Ritzen and Michael Woolcock (2006), “Social Cohesion, Institutions and Growth,” *Economics and Politics* 18 (2): 103–20.

³⁸ Easterly, Ritzen and Woolcock (2006), 103–4.

³⁹ Easterly, Ritzen and Woolcock (2006).

⁴⁰ Ritzen and Woolcock (2000), 25–26.

⁴¹ For an overview, see Hilary Silver (2015), “The Contexts of Social Inclusion,” Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) Work Paper No. 144 (New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs), October, accessed 30 November 2018, http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2015/wp144_2015.pdf.

⁴² OECD (2011), 51.

⁴³ OECD (2011), 51.

⁴⁴ World Bank (2012), 138–39. See also, the useful preparatory document by Norton and de Haan (2012).

⁴⁵ World Bank (2012), 127. The *WDR*'s Box 4.1 also provides a summary discussion: *What Is Social Cohesion?* (p. 128). Unfortunately, the box does not plump for a single definition.

⁴⁶ From World Bank (2012), 75.

⁴⁷ See UN Sustainable Development Goals, accessed 30 November 2018, <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs>. For an overview prepared for DESA in October 2015, see Silver (2015).

⁴⁸ For example, see Reza Hasmath, ed. (2015), *Inclusive Growth, Development and Welfare Policy: A Critical Assessment* (New York: Routledge); Jane Jenson (2015), “The ‘Social’ in Inclusive Growth: The Social Investment Perspective,” in *Inclusive Growth, Development and Welfare Policy: A Critical Assessment*, edited by Reza Hasmath (New York: Routledge), 108–23.

⁴⁹ 3RP (n.d. [2015]), *Regional Strategic Overview 2016–17*, 44, accessed 30 November 2018, <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/3RP-Regional-Overview-2016-2017.pdf>.

⁵⁰ For relatively comprehensive overviews of the academic as well as organizational literature, see Green, Janmaat and Han (2009), Norton and de Haan (2012), Schiefer and van der Noll (2016), and Jane Jenson (2010), *Defining and Measuring Social Cohesion*, Social Policies in Small States Series No. 1 (London and Geneva: Commonwealth Secretariat and UNRISD), accessed 30 November 2018,

<http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/search/170C271B7168CC30C12577D0004BA206?OpenDocument>. For an overview of the long-standing social-psychological literature on social cohesion (which has only marginally informed debates discussed here), see Friedkin (2004).

⁵¹ For a brief discussion of the French understanding of and debates about secularism, see the thematic overview of secularism by Niraja Gopal Jayal (2017), “Religion, Secularism and the State,” *Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies*, Global Centre for Pluralism, accessed 30 November 2018, https://www.pluralism.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/NirajaJayal_Secularism_EN.pdf.

⁵² Keith Banting (2008), “The Models in Our Minds: Conceptions of Social Integration and Immigrant Integration,” 2008 Expert Roundtable on Canada’s Experience With Pluralism, Global Centre for Pluralism, 1–14, accessed 30 November 2018, https://www.pluralism.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/banting_paper_pp4.pdf.

⁵³ Banting (2008), 1–2. For a discussion of German debates as well as policies and practices, see the Change Case by Jan Dobbernack (2017), “Citizenship, Nationality and Immigration in Germany,” *Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies*, Global Centre for Pluralism, accessed 30 November 2018, https://www.pluralism.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Germany_EN.pdf.

⁵⁴ The primary task of the Directorate General of Social Cohesion (DG III) of the Council of Europe

(1998–2011) was to foster social cohesion and to improve the quality of life in Europe for the genuine enjoyment of fundamental human rights and the respect of human dignity. It defined its work as preserving ethnic and cultural diversity, and framing social policies to promote protection of rights, social cohesion and a better quality of life in Europe. A reorganization folded actions on social cohesion into other branches in 2011. (http://www.coe.int/t/dgal/dit/ilcd/Archives/Fonds/Adm_Social_Cohesion_en.asp).

⁵⁵ Council of Europe [CoE] (2001), “Promoting the Policy Debate on Social Exclusion From a Comparative Perspective,” *Trends in Social Cohesion* No. 1 (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing), 5, accessed 30 November 2018, https://www.coe.int/t/dg3/socialpolicies/socialcohesiondev/source/Trends/Trends-01_en.pdf.

⁵⁶ Council of Europe [CoE] (2004), *A New Strategy for Social Cohesion. Revised Strategy for Social Cohesion*, European Committee for Social Cohesion, Strasbourg, 3, accessed 30 November 2018, https://www.coe.int/t/dg3/socialpolicies/socialcohesiondev/source/RevisedStrategy_en.pdf.

⁵⁷ In contrast, see the list of publications in the *Trends in Social Cohesion* series that focus predominantly on matters of social and economic inclusion. Accessed 30 November 2018, http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/socialpolicies/socialcohesiondev/trends_en.asp.

⁵⁸ OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (2011), *Guidelines for Educators on Countering Intolerance and Discrimination Against Muslims: Addressing Islamophobia Through Education*, accessed 30 November 2018, <http://www.osce.org/odihr/84495?download=true>.

⁵⁹ Commission on Integration and Cohesion (2007), *Our Shared Future*, accessed 30 November 2018, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.communities.gov.uk/archived/general-content/communities/commissionintegration/>.

⁶⁰ Commission on Integration and Cohesion (2007), 5 and *passim*.

⁶¹ *Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team*, accessed 30 November 2018, <http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/14146/1/communitycohesionreport.pdf>; Commission on Integration and Cohesion (2007), 38ff.

⁶² Emphasis in original. Department for Children, Schools and Families [DfCSF] (2007), *Guidance on the Duty to Promote Community Cohesion* (London: DfCSF), 3, accessed 30 November 2018, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130401151715/http://www.education.gov.uk/publications/eOrderingDownload/DCSF-00598-2007.pdf>. A curriculum for citizenship education was revised in 2008 to include a unit on “Identity and Diversity: Living together in the UK.” DfCSF (2007), 8.

⁶³ Marc et al (2012), 47–48.

⁶⁴ Dragolov et al (2013), 13.

⁶⁵ Dragolev et al (2013), 15.

⁶⁶ Dragolov et al (2014), 4.

⁶⁷ Dragolov et al (2013), 43–44. The general conclusion is that social cohesion is driven by a knowledge economy and economic affluence, and is undermined by “gaping income inequalities, but not by immigration.” Dragolov (2016), 76.

⁶⁸ See, for example, the effort to parse social cohesion and citizenship in Lebanon’s 2009 National Human Development Report, *Towards a Citizen’s State*, UNDP Human Development Report, accessed 30 November 2018, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/toward-citizen%E2%80%99s-state>.

⁶⁹ Will Kymlicka (2013), “Neoliberal Multiculturalism?,” in *Social Resilience in the Neoliberal Era*, edited by Peter A. Hall and Michelle Lamont (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 101.

⁷⁰ See, for example, the discussion of multiculturalism in Singapore in Daniel Goh’s Change Case.

⁷¹ Justin Trudeau (2015), “Diversity Is Canada’s Strength,” address in London, England, 26 November, accessed 30 November 2018, <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2015/11/26/diversity-canadas-strength#sthash.jdsC4rI6.dpuf>.

⁷² Rick Noack (2015), “Multiculturalism Is a Sham, Says Angela Merkel,” *Washington Post*, 14 December, accessed 30 November 2018, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/12/14/angela-merkel-multiculturalism-is-a-sham/>. See also, Jan Dobbernack’s Germany Change Case.

⁷³ From its White Paper consultations, the CoE reported this understanding of multiculturalism: “Whilst driven by benign intentions, multiculturalism is now seen by many as having fostered communal segregation and mutual incomprehension, as well as having contributed to the undermining of the rights of individuals—and, in particular, women—within minority communities, perceived as if these were single collective actors. The cultural diversity of contemporary societies has to be acknowledged as an empirical fact. However, a recurrent theme of the consultation was that multiculturalism was a policy with which respondents no longer felt at ease.” CoE (2008), “Living Together as Equals in Dignity,” *Council of Europe White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue*, May, 19, accessed 30 November 2018, https://www.coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/source/white%20paper_final_revised_en.pdf.

⁷⁴ For an alternative view that there is a globalization of multiculturalism around positions inspired and constrained by human rights and within a framework of liberal-democratic values, and that there is resilience even in neoliberal multiculturalism, see Will Kymlicka (2007), *Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity*

(Oxford: Oxford University Press); and Kymlicka (2013). For the Bolivian critique of neo-liberal multiculturalism, in contrast, see the Bolivian Change Case by Bret Gustafson (2017), “Diversity and Democracy in Bolivia: Sources of Inclusion in an Indigenous Majority Society,” Global Centre for Pluralism, Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies, accessed 30 November 2018, https://www.pluralism.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Bolivia_EN.pdf.

⁷⁵ CoE (2008), 17.

⁷⁶ See Recommendation CM/Rec (2015)1 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Intercultural Integration, accessed 30 November 2018, [https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM/Rec\(2015\)1&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet=EDB021&BackColorLogged=F5D383](https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM/Rec(2015)1&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet=EDB021&BackColorLogged=F5D383).

⁷⁷ Despite its form as a Recommendation (i.e., being written in terms of paragraphs “recalling,” “recognising,” “considering” and so on), the document actually provides a good up-to-date summary of the CoE’s thinking about pathways to social cohesion.

⁷⁸ See, for example, the European Commission’s *European Platform Against Poverty and Social Exclusion: A European Framework for Social and Territorial Cohesion*, accessed 30 November 2018, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0758:FIN:EN:PDF>.

⁷⁹ OECD (2011), 59.

⁸⁰ UNDP (2015), *2015 Human Development Report—Rethinking Work for Human Development*, interview with Selim Jahan, accessed 30 November 2018, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/rethinking-work-for-human-development>.

⁸¹ UNDP (2015), “Lead Author’s Speech at the Launch of the 2015 Human Development Report,” UNDP Human Development Reports, 14 December, accessed 30 November 2018, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/lead-author%20%99s-speech-launch-2015-human-development-report>.

⁸² UNDP (2015), *Work for Human Development*, UNDP Human Development Report 2015, 22, accessed 30 November 2018, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_report_o.pdf.

⁸³ 3RP (n.d. [2015]), “Livelihoods and Jobs,” 20ff.

⁸⁴ 3RP (n.d. [2014]), “Supporting Social Cohesion,” 20ff.

⁸⁵ World Bank (2012). See, for instance, UNDP (2015), *Work for Human Development*.

⁸⁶ CSDH (2008); WHO (2013).

⁸⁷ Jenson (2010).

⁸⁸ Easterly, Ritzen and Woolcock (2006).

⁸⁹ Dragolov et al (2013).

⁹⁰ See, for example, Schiefer and van der Noll (2016).

⁹¹ CoE (2004), 3.

⁹² Club de Madrid (n.d.), Shared Societies Project: United in Diversity, accessed 3 December 2018, <http://www.clubmadrid.org/programa/shared-societies-project/>.

⁹³ OECD (2011), 51.

⁹⁴ OECD (2011), 54.

⁹⁵ On this as one of the traditional and popular ways of identifying social cohesion, in addition to the examples provided previously, see Jenson (2010),

9–12; and Christel Kesler and Irene Bloemraad (2010), “Does Immigration Erode Social Capital? The Conditional Effects of Immigration-Generated Diversity on Trust, Membership and Participation Across 19 Countries, 1981–2000,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 43 (2): 320–22.

⁹⁶ An overview is provided in Barbara Arneil (2010), “Social Decline and Diversity: The Us versus the Us’s,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 43 (2): 28off.

⁹⁷ Arneil (2010), 282–83.

⁹⁸ Kesler and Bloemraad (2010), 238.

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