

Do trustworthy institutions matter for development? Corruption, trust, and government performance in Africa

Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 112 | Michael Bratton and E. Gyimah-Boadi

Introduction

In a memorable address to the Ghanaian Parliament on July 11, 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama asserted that “Africa doesn't need strongmen; it needs strong institutions.” He went on to refer to “strong parliaments, honest police forces, (and) independent judges” as institutions that help to ensure that governments “respect the will of their own people (and) govern by consent and not coercion.” Citing good governance as a key to prosperity, he added: “This is about more than just holding elections. It's also about what happens between elections.”

In a similar vein, the United Nations recognizes that good governance is a vital ingredient in poverty alleviation and socioeconomic development. The UN's Sustainable Development Goal No. 16 explicitly identifies “effective, accountable institutions” as essential elements in the development mix. Yet state capacity has been in short supply for too long in too many places. States with weak institutions can become havens for extremists, sites of humanitarian and human rights disasters, and sources of public health emergencies. Thus, even as development policy priorities evolve to address diverse aspects of human insecurity, there will always be a need for high-quality and high-capacity institutions.

This Afrobarometer dispatch explores whether African citizens think that political institutions – ranging from the state presidency to local government councils – are worthy of their trust and whether public trust matters for development outcomes. We focus on the popular trustworthiness of institutions as a convenient shorthand way to summarize the quality and capacity of political institutions from a public opinion perspective.

The analysis unfolds in three stages. First, we describe cross-country variations in levels of citizen trust in several types of state institutions and trace trends in these attitudes over time. Second, we identify a major – perhaps causal – factor that explains institutional distrust, namely public perceptions that state officials are corrupt. Third, we show links between trustworthy institutions and selected development outcomes, suggesting that institutions earning the public's trust are essential to the successful pursuit of development.

Afrobarometer surveys

Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues across more than 30 countries in Africa. After five rounds of surveys between 1999 and 2013, results from Round 6 surveys (2014-2015) are currently being published. Afrobarometer conducts face-to-face interviews in the language of the respondent's choice with nationally representative samples that yield country-level results with margins of error of +/-2% (for samples of 2,400) or +/-3% (for samples of 1,200) at a 95% confidence level.

This dispatch uses data from almost 54,000 interviews completed in 36 countries (see Appendix Table A.1 for a list of countries and fieldwork dates). Interested readers should visit <http://globalreleases.afrobarometer.org> for previous and upcoming Round 6 releases.

Key findings

- Across 36 countries in 2014/2015, Africans express more trust in informal institutions such as religious and traditional leaders (72% and 61% respectively) than in the formal executive agencies of the state (on average 54%).
- That said, people find certain executive agencies, such as the national army and the state presidency, to be quite trustworthy (64% and 57% respectively), especially when compared with legislative and electoral institutions (47% and 44% respectively).
- Popular trust in the executive institutions of the state varies considerably across African countries, from more than 80% in Niger and Burundi to less than 40% in Nigeria, Liberia, and São Tomé and Príncipe.
- Institutional trust is related to perceptions of corruption. If people think that office-holders are honest, they are likely to deem an institution trustworthy – and vice versa if they think officials are self-serving.
- Trustworthy institutions help to achieve the development outcomes that Africans say they want. For every one of the general public's stated development priorities, trust in the state is associated with positive popular assessments of government performance.
- Thus, socioeconomic development is not a purely technical or engineering exercise. Development outcomes also depend on good governance, which citizens assess partly in terms of whether they find political institutions trustworthy.

Trustworthy institutions


Public trust is an essential lubricant for the workings of any political system. Good governance does not rely solely on the mechanical enforcement of administrative standards or the legal enforcement of constitutional rules. It also requires that citizens share a widespread culture of social confidence that public officials – and the institutions they represent – will instinctively “do the right thing.” In a democracy, for example, citizens ought to be able to reasonably expect that public officials will govern on their behalf. If, however, government officials are perceived to violate the public's trust, then people will feel justified in withholding their voluntary compliance.

Do African citizens trust public institutions? How can the trustworthiness of institutions be measured? Which factors help explain (“cause”) institutional trust? And what are the developmental outcomes (“consequences”) of trust?

Figure 1 outlines a possible set of relationships. The object of interest is institutional trust, measured as the perceived trustworthiness of various political institutions as expressed by citizens in Afrobarometer surveys of public opinion. Conceptually, Figure 1 proposes that institutions are embedded in a social and developmental context that shapes institutions and that, in turn, the context is shaped by institutional interventions.

We propose that the way citizens regard the occupants of public office – whether as honest or corrupt – is among the principal “causes” of trust.¹ This relationship is depicted graphically by the uni-directional arrow on the left of the flow chart in Figure 1. We also suggest that trust has developmental “consequences” in the sense that trustworthy institutions are likely to have observable effects on outcomes like economic growth, personal security, and access to services. In this case, however, the relationship is recursive (as depicted by the bi-directional arrows on the right of Figure 1). In other words, positive development outcomes have a feedback effect: They increase popular trust that institutions are effective and accountable. In contrast to this virtuous cycle, however, it is equally plausible (and perhaps even more likely) that negative developmental outcomes can – in a vicious cycle – reinforce pre-existing popular perceptions that political institutions are untrustworthy.

Figure 1: Corruption, trust, and development outcomes
 | Proposed relationships



Popular trust in institutions


To measure institutional trust, Afrobarometer asks, “How much do you trust each of the following?” and then provides a list of 12 common political institutions found in African countries. Response categories range from “not at all” through “just a little” and “somewhat” to “a lot.” In the 2014/2015 surveys, most respondents offer a substantive reply; depending on the institution, only 2% to 8% say that they “don’t know” or “haven’t heard enough” to form

¹ In this paper, the language of “cause” and “consequence” is used colloquially rather than formally. Inferences are based on observed statistical associations between key variables. While causality cannot be definitively established, we nonetheless argue that our assumptions about directionality are, subject to further confirmation, the most plausible options available.

an opinion. Not surprisingly, more people hold views about the trustworthiness of well-known institutions such as the state presidency or the police force than about lesser-known bodies such as the tax department or the courts of law.

Figure 2 displays the distribution of positive responses (“somewhat” plus “a lot”) by type of institution across all 36 African countries. It shows that, in the public mind, the most trustworthy institutions are religious leaders (72%) and the national army (64%). On average, the least trusted institutions are the tax authorities (44%) and opposition political parties (36%). This pattern of public opinion is cross-nationally consistent: Institutions rank in the same order in almost every country surveyed. Across institutions, however, the range of responses is considerable; the most trusted institution attracts twice as much popular confidence as the least trusted institution.

Figure 2: Popular trust in institutions | by type of institution | 36 African countries | 2014/2015




Respondents were asked: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough to say?
 (% of respondents who say “somewhat” or “a lot”; N= 53,935)

Figure 3 presents the same data according to institutional sector. This alternative perspective offers three general insights. First, it confirms that the Africans we surveyed have far more confidence in informal institutions such as religious leaders (priests, pastors, and imams) and traditional leaders (chiefs, elders, and headmen) than in the formal institutions of the state. As such, people are telling us that they are more likely to use informal than formal channels in addressing felt needs. Second, among state institutions, popular trust is more forthcoming for agencies of the executive branch (presidency, army, and police, even including the tax department) than for the legislative branch (National Assembly and local government

councils), which supposedly represents the citizenry. This result raises the question of whether popular trust – at least to a degree – is blindly and uncritically granted. After all, citizens usually have fewer channels of information about, and recourse against, appointed officials in the executive branch than elected legislators, whom they can vote out of office.

Third, we note that African citizens have the lowest levels of institutional trust in the electoral sector, which here contains the electoral commission and the political parties that contest elections. On average, in a setting where two-thirds of the adult population trust informal institutions, fewer than half of all Africans interviewed express trust in electoral institutions. There is a paradox here. Of all the requirements of a functioning democracy (including the rule of law, legislative oversight of the executive, civilian control of the military, a vibrant civil society), elections are probably the most broadly and deeply institutionalized elements in Africa. And yet citizens seem to be saying they have least confidence in this sector, at least when they compare electoral institutions to a political regime in which decisions are made by informal elites or state executives.

Figure 3: Popular trust in institutions | mean trust score by institutional sector
 | 36 African countries | 2014/2015



Respondents were asked: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough to say?
 (mean % of respondents who say "somewhat" or "a lot"; N= 53,935)

Trust in the state

Setting informal institutions aside, we therefore observe a pattern of institutional trust in which citizens grant greatest legitimacy to the executive agencies of the state. For this reason, it is appropriate to concentrate analysis on this dimension of trust. It would be especially useful to have a single index of "trust in the state" to serve as an instrument for further analysis.

Table 1 suggests that Afrobarometer justifies the construction of such an index. It shows that popular attitudes toward the four core executive agencies – presidency, army, police, and

tax authority – do indeed cluster closely together.² People who trust one of these institutions usually trust all others. Because trust in the tax department fits least well, we proceed with an Index of Trust in the State based on public assessments of the trustworthiness of the presidency, army, and police. In parliamentary systems, trust in the prime minister is substituted for trust in the state president.

Table 1: Index of Trust in the State (core executive institutions) | citizen perceptions | validity and reliability tests | individual level | 2014/2015

Index	Indicators	Validity* Variance explained (%)	Reliability Cronbach's alpha (scale of 0-1)**
Trust in the State		59%	.737
	Trust president		(.685)
	Trust army		(.650)
	Trust police		(.638)
	Trust tax authority		(.749)

* Factor analysis method = principal components, no rotation

** Figures in parentheses show alpha if item is deleted.

N= 53,935


On average, a majority of African citizens (57%) find the executive institutions of the state to be worthy of “some” or “a lot” of their trust. But the range of country scores is enormous. Figure 4 contrasts extremely high average levels of expressed trust in the state in Niger and Burundi (above 80%) with extremely low levels in Nigeria, Liberia, and São Tomé and Príncipe (below 40%).

Popular trust in the executive institutions of the state is not a recent phenomenon. Afrobarometer has tracked trends in opinion on this subject in 16 countries over four surveys between 2005 and 2015 (see Figure 5).³ In these places, trust in the national army rose somewhat over the period (especially until 2012), whereas trust in the state presidency tended to decline slightly (but never fell below a solid majority). The police force, which is the executive agency with the most regular, day-to-day, front-line contact with the populace, experienced the largest decline in public trust over the past decade. Even so – for these 16 countries and for the full 36-country Afrobarometer sample – more Africans currently express confidence in the police forces than consider them untrustworthy.

² Factor analysis (principal components method) enables the discovery of this sort of regularity within a data set. In this case, it confirms that a single index is a valid summary measure of four component indicators because it (a) accounts for 59% of their variance and (b) captures the idea of trust in the state as a whole. The index is also statistically reliable, especially when the tax authority is dropped from the index (Cronbach's alpha = .749).

³ Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Figure 4: Trust in the state* | by country | 36 African countries | 2014/2015




* Core executive institutions only (president or prime minister, army, police)

Respondents were asked: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough to say?

(mean % of respondents who say "somewhat" or "a lot")

Figure 5: Trends in trust | core executive institutions of the state | 16 African countries | 2005-2015



Respondents were asked: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough to say?
 (mean % of respondents who say "somewhat" or "a lot")
 (Note: 2008/2009 army figure is imputed.)

Corruption and trust

What explains trust in the state? While many factors play a part in forming an institution's public reputation, one compelling driver is surely whether citizens suspect corruption. If people think that office-holders are honest, they are likely to deem the institution trustworthy – and vice versa if they think officials are self-serving. We therefore expect to find a strong negative relationship between popular perceptions of official corruption and trust in the state.

In the realm of political attitude formation, subjective perceptions may be more potent than objective experiences. Even lacking a firsthand encounter with a demand for a bribe from a public official, people will form estimates of trustworthiness from what they hear about official graft from family, friends, workmates, and the mass media – and perhaps even from the sidewalk rumour mill.

Afrobarometer measures such perceptions by asking, "How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough to say?" A list of 10 types of elite actors – from members of Parliament to business executives – is provided, eight of which overlap with the institutions for which data on trustworthiness are available. The scale of possible responses runs from "none of them" through "some" or "most" "to all of them."

As an illegal activity, corruption is often hidden, especially when it takes the form of grand (as opposed to petty) corruption. Unsurprisingly, people therefore are somewhat less certain in their opinions about the extent of corruption than they are about how much they trust. We

thus see higher levels of “don't know” responses on this subject, for example 13% for tax officials, 12% for the office of the president, and 11% for parliamentarians and judges.

Nevertheless, in their own minds, ordinary Africans consistently make a negative connection between corruption and trust. In Table 2, the sign on the correlation coefficient is always negative. And for every political institution, this relationship is strong (the correlation coefficients, always above $r = .350$, are unusually large, at least for individual-level data) and statistically significant (that is, almost certainly not due to chance).⁴

Importantly, the link between perceived corruption and institutional trust is most marked for core executive institutions of the state, including the president, the courts, and the police.⁵ Interestingly, African respondents also tell us that if religious leaders are seen as corrupt, they, too, risk impugning the reputations of the institutions they represent. Perhaps reflecting low levels of popular knowledge about the tax system, however, the corruption-trust connection is weaker (though still strong) for tax authorities.

Table 2: Corruption and trust | citizen perceptions | individual level | 36 African countries | 2014/2015

		Institutional trust							
		Pres.	Courts	Police	Rel. leaders	Nat. Assem.	Trad. leaders	Local govt.	Tax dept.
Perceived corruption	President	-.433***			“How much do you trust each of the following?”				
	Courts		-.388***						
	Police			-.387***					
	Religious leaders				-.386***				
	National Assembly	“How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption?”					-.377***		
	Traditional leaders						-.375***		
	Local government							-.359***	
	Tax department								-.357***

Pearson correlation coefficients (two-tailed sig)

*** significant at $<.001$

($N = 39,599$)

We cannot be certain that the flow of causality runs from perceptions of corruption to sentiments of institutional trust. After all, like the second set of arrows in Figure 1, the first arrow may also be bi-directional, that is, having two heads. Stated differently, there is some possibility that people's lack of trust in a given institution might induce them to infer that officials in that institution engage in corruption. But, rather than entertaining the possibility of reverse causality, we prefer a more commonsense scenario. It is likely that people are neutral

⁴ The test of association is the Pearson correlation coefficient, in which 0 = no association and 1 = perfect association. A coefficient that is significant at $.001$ *** has only a 0.1% chance of being wrong.


⁵ Afrobarometer Round 6 surveys did not measure perceived corruption in the army.

about matters of institutional trust until such time as they are exposed to information that gives them reason to form an opinion. By personally encountering corrupt officials – or, more likely, simply hearing stories about dishonest leaders from other sources – people arrive at a judgment, in this case distrust. For this reason, we contend that it is more probable that the arrow of causality runs from corruption to trust rather than in the reverse direction.

As a test of this proposition, consider the close bond between perceived corruption and popular trust in the police. Figure 6 depicts this relationship graphically at the aggregate (i.e. country) level. In an effort to infer causality, we measure perceived police corruption in Afrobarometer Round 5 (2011/2013), about three years prior to our Afrobarometer Round 6 (2014/2015) indicator of trust in the police in 33 countries included in both survey rounds. The logic of using a time-lagged predictor is to increase confidence that a prior condition is affecting a subsequent outcome and to reduce the possibility of mistaking a correlation for a cause.

According to Figure 6, people who had a positive view of police integrity in 2011/2013 (seeing “none” or only “some” corruption) tended to trust the police in 2014/2015. The overall relationship is strong ($r = .507$), which suggests that corruption alone explains about one-quarter of the variance in trust ($r^2 = .257$). The model works extremely well for some countries. In Kenya, for example, low perceived police integrity in 2011 predicts low trust in the police in 2014; and in Botswana, high 2012 integrity forecasts high trust in 2014. In a few countries – such as Burundi and Niger – the model works less well, with looser linkages between corruption and trust.

Figure 6: Corruption and trust (lagged) | popular perceptions of police | aggregate (country) level | 33 African countries | 2011-2015




Trust and development

We now turn from possible causes of institutional trust to potential consequences for economic and social development. After all, the state remains a principal agent of planned development in most African countries. Human welfare therefore depends in good part on whether its core agencies are effective and accountable and deemed so by the general public.

What kind of development do Africans want? To assess popular priorities, Afrobarometer asks, "In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that the government should address?" Survey respondents are able to offer up to three responses. The public's top 10 problems in 2014/2015 are displayed by the blue columns in Figure 7. Unemployment, which is cited by 37% of all persons interviewed, is the most frequently mentioned problem, followed by health care, education, and water supply. Corruption ranks 10th.

Figure 7: Most important problems and perceived government handling of these problems | 36 African countries | 2014/2015



Respondents were asked:

- In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address? (% of cases, based on up to three responses per respondent)
- How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Managing the economy? Improving the living standards of the poor? Creating jobs? Narrowing gaps between rich and poor? Reducing crime? Improving basic health services? Addressing educational needs? Providing water and sanitation services? Ensuring everyone has enough to eat? Fighting corruption in government? Maintaining roads and bridges? (% of respondents who say "fairly well" or "very well")

To assess outcomes, Afrobarometer tracks popular perceptions of “how the government is handling” each of these development sectors. Perceived government performance is represented by the yellow columns in Figure 7. The chart shows that citizens are dissatisfied with outcomes on their top-ranked problem (unemployment): Only 26% say that the government is performing “fairly well” or “very well” in creating jobs. Governments also fare badly on related economic tasks, with mere minorities expressing satisfaction with official performance at managing the macro-economy (38%), ensuring that people have enough to eat (32%), and improving the living standards of the poor (28%). Citizens give governments higher marks in the social sectors, where slim majorities (51%) report good performance in improving basic health services and addressing educational needs.

Does institutional trust matter for these development outcomes? In Table 3, we apply the Index of Trust in the State to search for possible associations. The first two columns of the table restate the data on most important problems and government performance from Figure 7. The third column reports results of correlation tests. It shows that for every one of Africa's top 10 development problems, the Index of Trust in the State is strongly and significantly related to popular perceptions of government performance.

The most robust association (.329***) is between institutional trust and management of the economy, which reflects a prevailing mass expectation that the state is responsible for guiding economic development. There is also a strong association between trust in the executive agencies of the state and popular satisfaction with government performance at controlling crime (.296***) and corruption (.292***). These results suggest that people recognize the state's essential function in guaranteeing law and order and that they rely on feelings of trust when assessing whether governments are delivering these fundamental political goods. In sum, when people trust the state, they also tend to think that the government is performing well at its basic and overarching development tasks.

Table 3: Institutional trust and development outcomes | citizen perceptions
| individual level | 36 countries | 2014/2015

Most important problems	Government performance (“fairly well” or “very well”)	Government performance by trust in the state**
Management of the economy	38%	.329***
Crime	45%	.296***
Corruption	30%	.292***
Poverty	28%	.260***
Unemployment	26%	.241***
Education	51%	.233***
Health care	51%	.232***
Food security	32%	.223***
Water supply	41%	.196***
Infrastructure	45%	.186***

** Pearson correlation coefficient
*** significant at .001
(N = 39,375)

As stated, the link between trust and performance is strong and significant in every development sector. But it is relatively weaker for economic and social activities for which people do not rely exclusively on the state. For example, institutional trust appears to matter for family food security (.223***) and household water supply (.196***) even though people provide all or some of these private goods for themselves. Oddly enough, however, the trust-performance connection holds only loosely for the provision of transportation infrastructure (such as roads and bridges) (.186***), even though this largely central government function is foundational to development.

Conclusion

This paper has begun to explore the extent, origins, evolution, and implications of institutional trust as expressed by more than 50,000 Africans in Afrobarometer surveys in up to 36 African countries. It has shown that people trust informal institutions more than formal ones and that, within the state, they trust executive institutions more than legislative or electoral ones. In the public mind, corruption is inversely related to trust, and an Index of Trust in the State is positively related to development outcomes.

A couple of puzzles remain. The first pertains to causality. Does trust shape assessments of development performance? Or, conversely, does good performance induce popular trust? Second, given that trust and corruption are (negatively) related, is trust even necessary for explaining development outcomes? Perhaps attitudes to corruption can explain perceptions of the government's performance on their own.

We cannot resolve either of these questions definitively in this brief analysis. By way of conclusion, we simply note that additional tests tend to support the proposition that trust matters for development. For example, trust in the state in 2011/2013 is a powerful predictor of development outcomes in 2014/2015, which is consistent with a causal story in which trust precedes developmental consequences.⁶ And when we run a simple regression model that includes both expressed trust and perceived corruption, we find that trust does not disappear but remains the leading predictor of perceived developmental effects.⁷

To further explore this data, please visit Afrobarometer's free online data analysis facility at www.afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis.

Thus, the results in this brief analysis are consistent with an independent role for trustworthy institutions in the development process in Africa. Stated differently, social and economic progress requires good governance. Those international donors who may be tempted to downplay the importance of democratic governance should remember that development is not a purely technical or engineering exercise. It also requires voluntary compliance, organized cooperation, and self-motivation from large numbers of ordinary citizens. Citizens are most likely to take part in a collective development enterprise if they have confidence that the institutions of the state are well governed. In short, regardless of economic or social sector, trustworthy institutions are an essential political element in the successful pursuit of development.

⁶ For example, trust in the state in 2011/2013 predicts popular assessments of government management of the economy: $r = .323^{***}$. A similar pattern holds for other aspects of government performance. Note that this result reflects aggregated country-level analysis.

⁷ For example, trust in the state ($\beta = .297$) explains almost twice as much variance in popular assessments of the government's management of the economy than the perceived corruption of government officials ($\beta = -.172$).

Appendix

Table A.1: Afrobarometer Round 6 fieldwork dates and previous survey rounds

Country	Months when Round 6 fieldwork was conducted	Previous survey rounds
Algeria	May-June 2015	2013
Benin	May-June 2014	2005, 2008, 2011
Botswana	June-July 2014	1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012
Burkina Faso	April-May 2015	2008, 2012
Burundi	September-October 2014	2012
Cameroon	January-February 2015	2013
Cape Verde	November-December 2014	2002, 2005, 2008, 2011
Côte d'Ivoire	August-September 2014	2013
Egypt	June-July 2015	2013
Gabon	September 2015	N/A
Ghana	May-June 2014	1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012
Guinea	March-April 2015	2013
Kenya	November-December 2014	2003, 2005, 2008, 2011
Lesotho	May 2014	2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012
Liberia	May 2015	2008, 2012
Madagascar	December 2015-January 2015	2005, 2008, 2013
Malawi	March-April 2014	1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012
Mali	December 2014	2001, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2013
Mauritius	June-July 2014	2012
Morocco	November 2015	2013
Mozambique	June-August 2015	2002, 2005, 2008, 2012
Namibia	August-September 2014	1999, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2012
Niger	April 2015	2013
Nigeria	December 2014-January 2015	2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2013
São Tomé and Príncipe	July-August 2015	N/A
Senegal	November-December 2014	2002, 2005, 2008, 2013
Sierra Leone	May-June 2015	2012
South Africa	August-September 2015	2000, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2011
Sudan	June 2015	2013

Country	Months when Round 6 fieldwork was conducted	Previous survey rounds
Swaziland	April 2015	2013
Tanzania	August-November 2014	2001, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012
Togo	October 2014	2012
Tunisia	April-May 2015	2013
Uganda	May 2015	2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012
Zambia	October 2014	1999, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2013
Zimbabwe	November 2014	1999, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2012

Other Round 6 global releases

- **Where to start? Aligning sustainable development goals with citizen priorities.** (2015). Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 67. Available at http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno67_african_priorities_en.pdf.
- **Building on progress: Infrastructure development still a major challenge in Africa.** (2016). Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 69. Available at www.afrobarometer.org/publications/ad69-building-progress-infrastructure-development-still-major-challenge-africa.
- **Africa's growth dividend? Lived poverty drops across much of the continent.** (2016). Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 29. Available at <http://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/pp29-africas-growth-dividend-lived-poverty-drops-across-the-continent>.
- **Good neighbours? Africans express high levels of tolerance for many, but not for all.** (2016). Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 74. Available at <http://afrobarometer.org/publications/tolerance-in-africa>.
- **Off-grid or 'off-on': Lack of access, unreliable electricity supply still plague majority of Africans.** Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 75. Available at <http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad75-unreliable-electricity-supply-still-plague-majority-of-africans>.
- **Lack of safe water, sanitation spurs growing dissatisfaction with government performance.** Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 76. Available at <http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad76-lack-of-safe-water-and-sanitation-spurs-growing-dissatisfaction>.
- **Despite gains, barriers keep health care high on Africa's priority list.** Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 31. Available at <http://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/pp31-despite-gains-barriers-keep-health-care-high-on-africas-priority-list>.
- **Strong public support for 'watchdog' role backs African news media under attack.** Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 85. Available at http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad85-media_in_africa_world_press_freedom_day_2016.
- **Regional integration for Africa: Could stronger public support turn 'rhetoric into reality'?** Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 91. Available at <http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad91-regional-integration-africa-could-stronger-public-support-turn-rhetoric-reality>.
- **Does less engaged mean less empowered? Political participation lags among African youth, especially women.** Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 34. Available at <http://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/youth-day-2016>.

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